



















The period in the visual arts between (roughly) 1860 and (roughly) 1960 is known as modernism. One grand question in the philosophy of art history (or philosophical art history) is what makes modernism in the visual arts different from other periods and movements. The question I want to raise is much narrower: whether there is such a thing as modernist portraiture. 
	On the face of it, this is not a very interesting question with an obvious positive answer. There are famous examples of portraits and self-portraits by modernist artists, from Matisse’s portraits of his wife to Van Gogh’s self-portraits. Or, to give some examples from photography, which is the primary domain of the discussion in this chapter, Cartier-Bresson’s portrait of Albert Camus and Marcel Duchamp, Andre Kertesz’s portrait of Sergei Eisenstein, Laszlo Moholy-Nagy’s portrait of Lucia Moholy-Nagy or Man Ray’s portrait of Frida Kahlo are as iconic as portraits get and these are the modernist photographers par excellence. So why worry about modernist portraiture? 
We should worry about modernist portraiture because it is not clear that what makes these pictures modernist and what make them portraits have a lot to do with one another. Just because a picture was made by a modernist artist, it is not clear that it makes the picture itself modernist. Kertesz himself made many photographs for various commercial magazines after the 2nd World War, most of which, presumably, would not count as modernist photography under any definition of modernism. So the same point could be made about his portraits and about the portraits of other modernists as well. Modernists may have made portraits because they had to pay the bill. Or maybe they needed a break from modernism and engaging with this very much pre-modernist genre provided just that relief. 




I don’t think there are necessary and sufficient conditions for modernist visual arts, let alone for modernism in general (in literature, in architecture, in dance and beyond). Clement Greenberg started the most influential paper on modernism in the visual arts by saying that “modernism includes more than art and literature. By now it covers almost the whole of what is truly alive in our culture” (Greenberg 1961). If so, then there is little hope that we may ever be able to find anything that is both non-trivial and is still in common in all human endeavors labelled as modernist (see Harrison 2009, Krauss 1972). 
The main challenge of saying anything substantial about modernism in the visual arts is that the amount of works of visual art produced during the roughly hundred years referred to as modernism and even of those works that are explicitly labelled as modernist is staggering and extremely diverse. Finding any common denominator between them that is non-trivial seems close to impossible. It seems that any such proposed common denominator would be either too narrow (so that it would not fit some obviously modernist artworks) or too broad (so that it would also fit some obviously non-modernist artworks). 
	
The three most influential suggestions (all originating from Clement Greenberg) are about the importance of the medium, self-referentiality and negativity. And these are very much intertwined: 

If we accept (as we ought to, I feel) that avant-garde painting, poetry, and music are characterized by an insistence on medium, then what kind of insistence has it been, usually? My answer would be-it is hardly an original one-that the medium has appeared most characteristically as the site of negation and estrangement. (Clark 1982, p. 152).

And it is this negation that then looms large: "negation is inscribed in the very practice of modernism […] the fact of Art, in modernism, is the fact of negation" (Clark 1982, p. 154). But this negation is a self-negation or self-critique, bringing in the third widely repeated aspect of modernism: self-referentiality: “The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of characteristic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself, not in order to subvert it but in order to entrench it more firmly in its area of competence” (Greenberg 1961).​[1]​ 

III.	Weak and strong conceptions of modernist portraiture

There are other ways to capture various aspects of modernism. There is no shortage of various more or less formal criteria for identifying modernist pictures, from thick brushstrokes to the blatant disregard of various perceptual constancies. One such approach is my own: I argued that modernist visual art has distinctive pictorial organization. It thematizes the conflict between scene pictorial organization and surface pictorial organization. 
	And if we focus on criteria like these, then at least some of the portraits modernist artists made do count as modernist portraiture. Matisse’s portraits of his wife use the very same kind of brushstrokes, color palate and pictorial organization as his other paintings. Ditto for Cezanne’s portraits of his mother. And the carpet pattern in Kertesz’s Eisenstein portrait, which takes up much of the surface, constitutes a geometrical composition that is very similar to some undeniably modernist Kertesz photographs. 
	The problem is that this only gives us modernist portraiture in a weak sense. According to this weak conception, there are pictures that are both modernist in some sense (in terms of their pictorial organization or brushstrokes) and portraits. But what makes these pictures modernist and what makes them portraits have nothing to do with each other. 
	A strong conception of modernist portraiture would be where modernist portraiture does not just stand for portraits that happen to be modernist, but where the fact that the picture is a portrait has something substantial to do with what makes it a modernist picture. 




Some modernist artists were very clearly aware of this tension between the genre of portraiture, which seems to necessitate a straightforward depiction of the sitter and modernism, which emphasizes something like negativity. And they exploited this tension with a vengeance. 
Andre Kertesz made a series of photographs in Piet Mondrian’s studio. One has become something like a modernist photography classic. The picture is divided in half vertically into two long rectangles. In the right rectangle we see the staircase through the doorframe. In the left rectangle we see a table with a vase on it and a hat on a hanger. While Kertesz made the photo with very little rearrangement of the scene, it is easy to see that the geometrical composition alludes to that of Mondrian’s paintings. Another photo Kertesz made on the same occasion is less famous, but bears even more resemblance to a Mondrian composition: it shows a part of Mondrian’s apartment that is difficult to identify and looks vaguely like some kind of storage. But almost all the contours on this Kertesz photograph are either more or less horizontal or more or less vertical, giving a good approximation of a Mondrian painting. 
The crucial thing about these two photographs is that Mondrian himself is not on them. The same is true of a third, also somewhat iconic photograph made on the same occasion. It is a still life, with two of Mondrian’s glasses and his pipe. They are arranged carefully, but, again, the painter is not visible, only his private, and very personal, possessions. Kertesz also made traditional portraits of Mondrian, where he is seated on a wicker chair, looking somewhat sternly in the camera. But hardly anyone knows that Mondrian portrait, whereas everyone who knows anything about modernist photography knows some of Kertesz’s Mondrian-free Mondrian portraits. 
Another modernist photographer who clearly saw the tension between portraiture and modernism was Robert Doisneau. One of his best-known photographs is a portrait of the French artist Jean Tinguely, standing next to one of his sculptures. In the left hand side of the photo, we see the sculpture and the Eiffel Tower in the background. On the right hand there is the full figure of the impeccably dressed Tinguely, but his head is shrouded in a thick cloud of smoke. We see his legs and his left hand, but not his head or face. This is the exact opposite of what we normally expect from a portrait. Tinguely’s work (the sculpture on the left), his city (Paris in the background) and his outfit is what we see, not his face. 
Doisneau made a number of portraits of his neighbour Fernand Leger. In one, Leger’s face and torso are in full view, so in this sense, it might seem that it is a traditional portrait, untainted by modernist worries. But he is surrounded by his paintings: he is standing in front of a wall covered by his paintings and he is holding a large canvas in front of him, which occludes his body from the chest down. The effect of this is that when you look at this photo, you first see Leger’s paintings and not Leger himself. It is not even that easy to spot Leger, which is a remarkable feature of this photo in itself as it emphasizes how the human figures in Leger paintings attract our attention more than photographic representations of human figures. 
The effect is similar to that of a Where is Waldo picture, where you need to actively look in order to find Waldo – and you need to actively look in order to find Leger himself among the paintings he made. This portrait is a subtle take on the tension between modernism and portraiture inasmuch as it does, on the face of it, give us what standard portraiture is supposed to be about. It does not occlude the sitter’s face behind a cloud of smoke. But the visual effect is nonetheless a confusing one and what we see first, and what is difficult to then unsee, is the painting, not the painter. 
A more explicit commentary on the tension between modernism and portraiture is a lesser known photograph by Doisneau, also made in Leger’s studio, where we can only see a piece of paper stuck on the wall, which says, with Leger’s handwriting: “ATTENDEZ: Je reviens de suite. F. Leger” (WAIT: I will be back soon. F. Leger). This is the most explicit reference to the absence of the sitter in any modernist portrait I know. 
A less explicit (and also less subtle) artist who makes portraits of people not visible is Andres Serrano. This is true of many of his portraits, but most obviously of his series about the upper ranks of the Ku Klux Klan, all of whom are pictured in their hood, but with their ranks and regalia displayed. 
The tension between modernism and portraiture is also very explicit in the case of some of the self-portraits of modernist photographers. Kertesz’s most famous self-portrait is really a picture of his shadow (and the shadow of the camera that is taking the photograph). We can see Kertesz’s distinctive profile, so this is more of a traditional portrait than Doisneau’s Tinguely photograph. Still, many of the features of Kertesz’s face remain hidden. 
Another iconic self-portrait by a modernist photographer by Laszlo Moholy-Nagy. In some sense, this could be seen as a traditional self-portrait: we can clearly see his face and bust. Although the face is off centre, it is not out of focus. There is one oddity: Moholy-Nagy’s face is partly occluded by his hand that he holds out towards the camera, appearing to be objecting to have his photograph taken, making the composition somewhat reminiscent to some of the photos of celebrities trying to avoid their photo taken by paparazzi. Interestingly, while the hand is out of focus, the face is not, underlying the traditional aspects of this self-portrait. 

V.	A detailed contemporary case study – Mariela Sancari: Moises

Besides the better-known classic examples I talked about in the last section, I want to go through a contemporary case study of genuine modernist portraiture more slowly. I have chosen Mariela Sancari’s series called Moises. Sancari is an Argentinian photographer who mainly works in Mexico. Moises was her first book, published in 2005. It is about Sancari’s father, whose name was Moises. He died when Sancari was a small child and she was not allowed to see the body – unclear whether the reason for this was that he had committed suicide or some kind of religious considerations. Either way, this made her father’s death in some sense unreal for Sancari. 




The aim of this ad was not to find Moises, but rather to find sitters for his portraits. People with very different looks responded and Sancari took photos of them wearing the clothes she still had from his father (and that she remembered him wearing). The photos are formally quite traditional portraits, with a blank background and the sitter often looking in the camera. There are multiple photographs, often three, of all the individual sitters, often from different angles. According to the artist, none of the sitters resembled her father. 

Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 here

This formal monotony is broken in three images, where we see the artist herself behind the sitter, always either occluded behind him (and partly turned away) or partly off screen and turned away from the camera. On one of these images, probably the most emotionally draining of all of them, the older man is combing the artist’s hair (who is almost entirely off screen). 

Figure 5 and Figure 6 here

These are all references to the very few details that the artist remembers about her father. She remembers him combing her hair, for example. She also remembers the clothes. And the eyes. The men she photographed don’t resemble each other, and, according to the photographer, they don’t resemble her father either. 
These portraits are put together in book form in an unusual manner – the pages fold in and out in an extremely complex way, hiding and revealing new portraits and often alluding to the triptych format. This leads to a complex interaction between the images, which also presupposes the reader’s active involvement to uncover this complexity. 
These photos of random elderly men are undeniably about the artist’s father, Moises. They are also, in some really important sense, of Moises. The catch is that Moises does not exist. Sancari’s work is the ultimate endpoint of the modernist tendency of creating portraits of people not present.  

VI.	Portraits of what now?

The title of this paper is ‘Portraits of people not present’. And I hoped to show that modernist portraiture (in the strong sense of the term) aims at exactly this effect. Very much in the spirit of the negativity of modernism, it aims to give us portraits of people not present. 
But how is this even possible? How can one make a portrait of someone not present? A portrait is a portrait because it depicts the sitter. If we can’t see the sitter in the picture, it is not the depiction of the sitter. So it’s not a portrait. The entire concept of ‘portraits of people not present’ seems to be a contradiction in terms. 
One important distinction to evoke here is the one between what the picture depicts and what the picture represents (Wollheim 1987, 1998, Armstrong 1997). A medieval painting of the Trinity may depict a dove, but by depicting the dove, it represents the Holy Spirit. So it is definitely possible for a portrait to represent its sitter without depicting it. 
And, arguably, this is what happens in Kertesz’s Mondrian portraits. Piet Mondrian is not depicted here. But, in some sense, he is represented. And it is also what happens in Sancari’s Moises series. Her father is not depicted – and he could not be depicted as he is not alive. But he is represented. 
But one might worry that this is not much of an explanation, but merely the relabelling of the phenomenon and this relabelling is not particularly informative in and of itself. The big question is how a picture manages to represent something it does not depict. How does a painting of a dove represent the Holy Spirit? How does a photo of Mondrian’s apartment or glasses represent Piet Mondrian himself? And how does a collection of portraits of random elderly men represent a man who died decades ago? 
In some of the examples I used above, we do not get this distinction between what is depicted and what is represented. Yet, the effect seems to be very similar. The Doisneau portrait of Leger among his paintings depicts Leger. He is clearly visible. The figures in the paintings around him confuse our perception and we don’t immediately recognise him, but he is there clearly in sight. Contrast this with the other Doisneau portrait of Leger, which shows only a sign saying that he’ll return soon. That is a classic example of representing Leger, who is not depicted in the photo. Nonetheless, the effect is very similar. If we want to understand how it is possible to make portraits of people not present, we need to dig deeper.  

VII.	Portraits and mental imagery

Here is one of the most evocative passages ever written on picture perception: 

I look at a picture that includes a classical landscape with ruins. And now imagine the following dialogue: “Can you see the columns?” “Yes.” “Can you see the columns as coming from a temple?” “Yes.” “Can you see the columns that come from the temple as having been thrown down?” “Yes.” “Can you see them as having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago?” “Yes.” “Can you see them as having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago by barbarians?” “Yes.” “Can you see them as having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago by barbarians wearing the skins of wild asses?” (Pause.) “No.” (Wollheim 2002, p. 224)

Wollheim’s idea is that we see more in pictures than what is depicted in these pictures. This would be one way of understanding the distinction between what is depicted and what is represented in a picture. What is depicted in this painting is the ruins. And what is represented is the ruins “having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago by barbarians”. And the reason why this latter is represented is that we can see this when we look at the painting. 
But is ‘seeing’ the right word here? Wollheim famously held that imagining is a kind of seeing: He writes: “when I imagine seeing the façade of St Peter’s, then, necessarily, I see the façade of St Peter’s” (Wollheim 1974, p. 55). This use of the term is somewhat idiosyncratic. Most philosophers nowadays would make a sharp distinction between imagining, a voluntary mental action and perception, which is not voluntary and it is not obviously an action (and even if it is, it is not an intentional action, like imagination most often is) (see Kind 2001, 2013, Van Leeuwen 2013, 2014, 2016). 
So let’s move away from Wollheim’s terminology and use the more innocent concept of mental imagery instead. When you look at the painting of the ruins, you can have mental imagery of them having been thrown down some hundreds of years ago by barbarians and this mental imagery could be prompted by the painting itself. You could also have mental imagery of these barbarians “wearing the skins of wild asses”, but this mental imagery would not be prompted by the painting itself. 
Note that this distinction is not the same as the one Walton makes between authorized and unauthorized games of make-believe (Walton 1990, esp. pp. 398-400). Mental imagery is not make-believe (see Lopes 2003 and Stokes forthcoming for detailed analyses). When you look at Cartier-Bresson’s photograph Behind the Gare St. Lazare, which depicts a man trying to jump over a puddle, we are prompted to have (temporal) mental imagery of him landing in the puddle. But this is not a case of an authorized game of make-believe. 
Mental imagery, the way I use the term, is a perceptual process that is not triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation in the relevant sense modality. That is also the way psychologists and neuroscientists use the term (see, for example, Pearson et al. 2015). And we have plenty of (empirical and theoretical) reasons to think that what we take to be perception is really a hybrid of sensory stimulation-driven perceptual processes and mental imagery (see Nanay 2018a, 2018b, forthcoming a for summary). A lot has been written about the role mental imagery plays in our aesthetic appreciation of the visual arts – from the filling in of off-screen spaces (Burch 1973, Nanay 2018b) to multimodal mental imagery evoking experiences in non-visual sense modalities (Starr 2013, Nanay 2018b, forthcoming b). But it also plays a crucial role in picture perception (Nanay 2016, 2018c). 
Using the distinction between what we see in a picture and what we have mental imagery of (where this mental imagery is prompted by the picture) can explain most cases of the otherwise somewhat obscure distinction between what is depicted and what is represented. We see in the picture what is depicted. We have mental imagery of what is represented. I said it can explain most cases, and not all, because, for example, I’m not sure whether we are justified to talk about the mental imagery of the Holy Spirit upon seeing a dove in a painting (nor am I sure what the mental imagery of the Holy Spirit would be). 
And this distinction is very helpful when we talk about portraits of people not present. When we look at portraits of people not present, we do not see the sitter. We have mental imagery of the sitter. In the Kertesz self-portrait, we only see the shadow of Kertesz’s profile. We do not see Kertesz in the picture. But we can, and would, form mental imagery of Kertesz’s face prompted by the picture of the shadow of his profile. 
And it has been argued that we represent of occluded parts of perceived objects (or, in this case, persons) by means of mental imagery (Nanay 2010, 2018b, forthcoming a). And the form of mental imagery that is utilized in representing occluded parts of perceived objects plays an equally important role in portraits of people not present. In the Serrano portraits of the Ku Klux Klan members, we form mental imagery of the faces behind the hoods. And both in Moholy-Nagy’s self-portrait and in Doisneau’s portrait of Tinguely the faces are partially or fully occludes (behind Moholy-Nagy’s hand and behind a cloud of smoke, respectively). 
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